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This paper analyses changes in the distribution of equivalised gross 
household income and income inequality in New Zealand between 1983 and 
1998. We analyse the distributional effects of changes in household structure, 
National Superannuation (old age pension), household socio-demographic 
attributes and employment outcomes, and in the “economic returns” to such 
attributes and employment outcomes, using a semiparametric kernel density 
approach, and assess the impact of these factors on alternative summary measures 
of inequality over the period. We find that changes in household structure and in 
the socio-demographic characteristics of households are the main factors 
contributing to the rise in inequality, while the large changes in the employment 
outcomes had a more modest impact, and there is little evidence of systematic 
effects of changes in the economic returns. The results are qualitatively robust to a 
variety of equivalisation, income, and weighting measures. 
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There has been a dramatic increase in the degree of income inequality 
in New Zealand since the early 1980s. This increase was more pronounced than 
that in the United States and was large enough to move New Zealand from a mid-
ranking OECD country to having one of the most unequal income distributions in 
the OECD.
1 The period of increasing inequality coincided with a period of 
dramatic economic and social policy reform in New Zealand, which naturally has 
led to considerable interest in possible links between the two, and to what the 
New Zealand experience can tell us about the links between inequality and 
reform. 
The New Zealand literature documenting the change has most typically 
focused on the Gini coefficient as a summary measure of income inequality, and 
documented increasing inequality across a broad range of alternative income 
measures.
2 Although the rise in inequality has been well documented, the reasons 
for the increase are less well understood. Several “reforms”-related hypotheses 
have been proposed to explain the rising inequality, including the effects of trade 
liberalisation which have affected domestic industry, hence employment and 
income; the effects of labour market reform, particularly the Employment 
Contracts Act (ECA), which reduced support for collective bargaining; and social 
policy reform, which reduced the generosity of income support for some welfare 
beneficiaries.
3 However, secular trends in social and demographic factors, such as 
the population and household age structure and the incidence of sole-parent 
families, may also have contributed to the change in inequality.
4 
                                                           
1 For instance, the Gini coefficient on equivalised disposable income in New Zealand increased 
from 0.27 in 1982 to 0.33 in 1996; this was similar to the increase in the UK (from 0.28 in 1981 to 
0.33 in 1996) and substantially larger than the US (0.34 in 1984 and 1995) and other OECD 
countries—see Figure 7.2 in Statistics New Zealand (1999). 
2 These include both individual and family or household incomes, measures of market, gross and 
disposable income, and measures of equivalised and non-equivalised income. For example, see 
O’Dea (2000), Statistics New Zealand (1999), Podder and Chatterjee (1998), and Martin (1998).  
Easton (1996) provides a recent evaluation of longer-term trends in income inequality in New 
Zealand, with a particular focus on the post-1984 period. Dixon (1996, 1998) examined changes in 
earnings and labour market outcomes of individuals over this period. 
3 See Silverstone et al (1996) for analyses of the effects of a range of policy and economic reforms. 
4 See Davey (1998) and Statistics New Zealand (1998). 2 
This paper investigates the changes in the distribution of household 
incomes in New Zealand between 1983 and 1998 using data from the Household 
Economic Survey (HES). The analysis focuses on two issues that distinguish it 
from previous literature. First and foremost, we focus on the entire distribution of 
income, rather than simply summary measures of inequality which may be 
relatively uninformative regarding changes in the income distribution and may be 
quite sensitive to changes in specific areas of the income distribution. Second, we 
adapt a semiparametric approach developed by DiNardo et al (1996) to focus on 
how changes in various sets of factors affect both the overall distribution of 
income and summary measures of inequality.
5 This approach facilitates a visual 
appreciation of the factors associated with distributional changes, and can be used 
to derive summary measures of inequality and the contribution of various factors 
to changes over the period. We focus on five sets of factors: household structure; 
the statutory rate of National Superannuation (old-age pension, NS); socio-
demographic attributes; employment outcomes; and the economic “returns” to 
socio-demographic attributes. Although we do not attempt to isolate the 
distributional impact of any specific policy reform, the analysis provides 
information on the nature of the distributional changes and the extent to which 
they were associated with particular sets of observable household attributes. Our 
concluding comments discuss the implications of our findings for 
characterisations of the impact of the reform process. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we discuss the 
data and describe the trends in aggregate inequality measures and possible 
correlates of these trends. In Section 3, we present the empirical framework used 
to construct counterfactual income distributions under assumptions about changes 
in each set of factors over time. Using kernel density methods we describe the 
effects of these changes between the three years at the beginning of the sample 
period (1983–86) and the three years at the end (1995–98). In Section 4 we use 
the counterfactual distributions to estimate alternative summary measures of 
inequality, and use these to decompose the change in inequality over the period 
into the effects of the various factors we examine. Section 4 also considers the 
                                                           
5 Also see Daly and Valletta (2000) for a recent analysis of wage and income inequality in the US.  
3 
robustness of the results to four issues: the ordering of the sequential 
decomposition; alternative equivalised income measures; heterogeneity of effects 
over household types; and sub-period changes. The paper concludes with a 
discussion in Section 5. 
We find that changes in household structure can account for between 
10% and one-third of the observed changes in the household income distribution 
and inequality, depending on the specific measure used. In addition, changing 
socio-demographic attributes of households can account for a similar fraction of 
the observed changes. Somewhat surprisingly, the substantial changes in 
employment over the period had relatively modest effects on overall income 
inequality; however, these changes did have a larger effect on inequality measured 
at the household-type level. Although changes in NS play a prominent role in 
localised changes in the distribution, this factor contributes relatively little to 
changes in broad measures of inequality, largely due to offsetting changes for 
singles and couples. Finally, we find no systematic effects of changes in economic 
returns to attributes on the household income distribution and inequality. 
2  Data and descriptive analysis 
This section describes the data that we use, and presents an overview of 
the trends in household income inequality and other factors of interest over the 
sample period. The data come from Statistics New Zealand’s Household 
Economic Surveys (HES, formerly known as the Household Expenditure and 
Income Survey) over the period 1983–1998. The HES is a household-based 
survey which samples approximately 3,000 households annually, from April to 
March, and collects information on the household structure, socio-demographic 
characteristics and relationships of individuals in the household, together with 
income from various sources and some basic labour market information on 
individuals. For the first three years of the period (1983/84–1985/86), the sample 
frame used for the HES was a simple random sample of households; for the later 4 
years (1986/87–1997/98), a stratified random sample of households was drawn in 
each year.
6 
The “family” is the basic unit within which the welfare of individuals in 
general and children in particular is assessed, and disposable income is the 
preferred measure of current resources available. However, for measurement 
reasons, our analysis focuses primarily on household gross reported cash income.
7 
We adjust household income relative to a two-person household using the 
Luxembourg (0.5) equivalence scale, which divides income by the square root of 
one-half of the number of individuals in the household, and adopt the individual 
as the unit of analysis by weighting the data using the HES household sampling 
weight multiplied by the number of individuals in the household.
8  In Section 4 we 
examine the robustness of the results to these various choices, and consider 
measures of disposable income, and alternative equivalence scales and units of 
observation. Nominal gross incomes are adjusted to 1999 dollar values using the 
Consumers Price Index (CPI) that excludes the effects of the Goods and Services 
Tax (GST), while nominal disposable incomes are adjusted using the CPI 
including GST effects.
9 In order to lessen the effects of outliers, and to facilitate 
graphical presentation, we have left- and right-censored equivalised income at 
seven log-points (approximately $1,100) and 12.25 log-points (approximately 
$209,000) respectively: this affects 1% of low incomes and 0.6%of high incomes. 
                                                           
6 The stratification is by region, rural/urban, and by ethnicity (Māori in most strata, and Pacific 
Islands Polynesians in Auckland and Wellington). 
7 Households are empirically better defined than families. If unrelated individuals share the same 
household (e.g. flatmates), this will tend to overstate the resources available to individuals; on the 
other hand, if individuals receive support from outside the household (e.g. students living away 
from home), this will tend to understate resources available to individuals. Estimating household 
disposable income accurately requires detailed information on the relationships of individuals in 
the household, together with knowledge of tax and rebate eligibility and the relevant take-up 
propensities. In addition, annual incomes reported in the HES pertain to twelve-month periods that 
do not in general correspond to tax years. 
8 See, for example, Danziger and Taussig (1979), Jenkins (1991), and Jenkins and Cowell (1994) 
for discussions of alternative equivalence scales. One reasonably flexible approach is to equivalise 
income (Y) as E = Y/(λ(NA + κNC))
σ, where 1/λ identifies the base household size, NA and NC are 
the numbers of adults and children in the household respectively, and σ captures the economies of 
scale associated with household size. The Luxembourg (0.5) scale adopted uses λ = 0.5, κ = 1 and 
σ = 0.5. 
9 A 10% rate of GST was introduced on 1 October 1986, and increased to 12.5% on 1 July 1989. 
We have used a CPI (ex GST) series estimated by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. Given the 
substantial changes in the tax and benefit regimes in the late 1980s, it is not obvious what is the 
best method to adjust the nominal reported incomes in the HES to constant-price values. We 
believe that a GST-exclusive adjustment is more suitable for gross market incomes, while a GST-
inclusive adjustment is more suitable for disposable incomes.  
5 
Figure 1 describes the trends in the mean, median and Gini coefficient 
of equivalised household income from the HES for each year from 1983/84–
1997/98, with each series indexed to 100 in 1983/84. This figure reveals some 
interesting relationships between the level and dispersion in incomes over the 
period. First, mean equivalised income increased about 10% between 1983/84 and 
1989/90, then fell nearly 15% during the first half of the 1990s before rising again 
for a (net) 10% increase over the period. Median incomes increased about 6% 
until 1988, and then fell 15% though until 1994, before rising again to finish with 
a 1% net gain over the period. These differences suggest that higher incomes rose 
quite strongly, while lower and middle incomes rose, at best, only modestly over 
the period. Second, the Gini coefficient increased nearly 15% between 1983/84 
and 1990/91, and continued to rise modestly during the 1990s. 
Figure 1: Relative change in household income levels and inequality: 
1983/4–1997/8 
 
We use aggregated three-year HES samples corresponding to the 
beginning (1983–86), middle (1989–92) and end (1995–98) of the period in order 
to increase the period-specific sample sizes to improve the reliability of the 
subsequent analysis. Although this means that point-in-time estimates of the 
income distribution will be susceptible to year-to-year changes within each period, 






































Mean Equivalised Household Income
(1984=$42,000)
Median Equivalised Household Income
(1984=$36,600)6 
between rather than within the three sub-periods that we analyse. Table 1 presents 
the sample characteristics for each of these three-year periods. There are several 
changes worth noting in Table 1 that potentially affect the income distribution and 
inequality. Note, first, the change in household structure as characterised by the 
number and age of adults, and the presence or absence of children, in the 
household.
10 The most salient changes in household structure are the decline in the 
fraction of individuals living in multiple adult with children households (e.g. two-
parent families), from 58% in 1983–86 to 50% in 1995–98, and the increase in the 
fraction living in single adult with children households, from 4 to 7%. In addition 
to these changes, the fractions of individuals living in households without children 
increased modestly over the sample period. To the extent that the income 
distribution varies with household structure, these changes in household structure 
will have an impact on the overall distribution of household income and hence 
inequality over the period. 
                                                           
10 In particular, we distinguish between single- and multiple-adult households, between households 
with and without children and, for households without children, between those with adults under 
and over 60. The age criterion is intended to distinguish between predominantly “retired” and 
working-age households. For multiple adult households, we have classified the household as “over 
60” if the age of the eldest adult is over 60 and either (i) all adults are over 50; or (ii) the fraction 
of total household income from NS is at least 50%. Otherwise we have classified the household as 
“under 60”. The eligibility age for NS was 60 until 1991, and increased to 65 at the rate of 0.5 year 
annually. Although this affected the retirement behaviour of those in their early 60s (e.g., see 
Coleman and Hansen, 1996, and Frame, 1999), we maintain a fixed age criteria over the sample 
period to separate households.  
7 
Table 1: Sample characteristics 
   
 
 1983–86  1989–92  1995–98 
   
 
Mean equivalised income  42,044  44,326  44,867 
   (276)  (404)  (420) 
Median equivalised income  36,496  36,804  35,703 
 
Gini coefficient  0.316  0.346  0.366 
 
No. persons  3.73  3.52  3.52 
   (.03)  (.03)  (.02) 
No. adults  2.30  2.25  2.21 
   (.01)  (.01)  (.01) 
Age of adults  39.28  40.89  41.39 




 Female  0.52  0.53  0.54 
   (.002)  (.002)  (.003) 
 Married  0.69  0.64  0.68 
   (.004)  (.005)  (.005) 
 M āori
(b) 0.08  0.10  0.11 
   (.003)  (.004)  (.004) 
 School  qualifications
(c) 0.24  0.32  0.33 
   (.004)  (.005)  (.005) 
 Vocational  qualifications
(c) 0.23  0.25  0.25 
   (.004)  (.005)  (.005) 
 University  qualifications
(c) 0.09  0.09  0.14 
   (.002)  (.003)  (.004) 
 Employed  full-time  0.58  0.47  0.48 
   (.003)  (.004)  (.004) 
 Employed  part-time  0.09  0.13  0.15 
   (.002)  (.003)  (.003) 
 
Fraction of households: 
  Single adult over 60  0.037  0.045  0.042 
  Multiple adults over 60  0.027  0.032  0.034 
  Single adult under 60  0.094  0.110  0.099 
  Multiple adults under 60  0.226  0.231  0.251 
  Single adult with children  0.040  0.061  0.072 
  Multiple adults with children 0.577  0.521  0.503 
 
Number of households  10,578  9,296  8,698 
   
Notes:Standard errors are in parentheses. All means are weighted by the HES household sample 
weights multiplied by the number of persons in the household. Thus, estimates are equivalent to 
one observation per person. Incomes are measured in constant (1999) dollars. 
(a) Adults are defined as those persons aged at least 18 or aged 15–18 with positive wage and 
salary or benefit income. 
(b) In the years after 1992, up to three ethnic groups could be selected. In this period “Māori” is 
coded if any of the three ethnic groups are Māori—the fraction of “only Māori” in 1995–98 is 
0.06. 
(c) Based on “working-age” households only. 8 
Second, Table 1 shows there was a substantial decline in full-time 
employment during the mid to late 1980s; and, although there was some pickup in 
the 1990s, the fraction of adults employed full time was 10% lower in 1995–98 
than in 1983–86. Part of this decline in full-time employment is made up by an 
increase in part-time employment: the incidence of part-time employment grew 
substantially, from 9 to 15%, over the period. To the extent that (un)employment 
is not evenly distributed across households, these findings suggest that 
employment loss may help explain the rise in income inequality, given the 
importance of labour earnings to household income. 
Third, Table 1 also reveals some large changes in the socio-
demographic attributes of households. Education levels increased substantially 
over the period: the fraction of adults with School qualifications increased from 
one quarter to one third, and those with University qualifications increased from 9 
to 14%. In addition, the population was ageing: the average age of adults 
increased more than two years over the period. Each of these factors may 
influence the distribution of income over the period. As with the rise in inequality 
shown in Figure 1, Table 1 suggests that such changes tended to be concentrated 
in the late 1980s. 
3  Changes in the equivalised household 
income distribution between 1983–86 and 
1995–98 
In this section we develop an empirical framework to examine the 
influence of the several factors on the distribution of income. The analysis uses 
and extends a semiparametric conditional density estimation framework 
developed by DiNardo et al (1996). This framework has several features. First, it 
allows an assessment of the entire distribution of household income at a given 
point in time, and changes in the distribution over time, as well as summary 
measures of inequality. Second, it facilitates the sequential construction of 
counterfactual distributions for changes in various sets of factors. The sets of 
explanatory factors we focus on are household structure, socio-economic 
attributes of households, employment outcomes of households, and the economic 
“returns” to attributes. Third, these counterfactuals enable the changes in the 
distribution and in alternative summary measures of inequality to be decomposed  
9 
into changes due to such factors. We will describe the effects of changes in the set 
of explanatory variables on the distribution of household income here, and leave 
the decomposition of changes in inequality measures until the next section. 
We begin by describing the distribution of equivalised household 
income in the HES samples in 1983–86 and 1995–98 (represented by t = 0 and t = 
1 respectively). Specifically, we estimate the probability density, ft(y), associated 
with log household income y in time period t, using kernel density methods. If 
(yt1, ..., ytN) is a random sample of N observations in period t, with sampling 
weights (θt1, …, θtN) (∑
N
1 = i
θti = 1), the kernel density estimate of ft(y) is 






y   - y 
K   .  
h





θ ˆ  (1a) 
where h is the bandwidth, and K(.) is the kernel function. Throughout the analysis, 
we estimate densities at 250 equi-spaced log income values between seven and 
12.25, using a fixed bandwidth h = 0.05, and the Epanechnikov kernel (K(z) = 
0.75((1–z
2)/5)/√5, if |z|<√5; and K(z) = 0, otherwise).
11 
Figure 2a presents the kernel density estimates of the distributions of 
equivalised household incomes over the 1983–86 and 1995–98 periods. (The 
horizontal axis is on a logarithmic scale.) Although the 1983–86 distribution is 
asymmetric, as evidenced by the median being lower than the mean, with distinct 
shoulders around $19,000 and $25,000, it is broadly bell-shaped with a peak 
around $40,000. In contrast, the 1995–98 distribution of equivalised income is 
distinctly bi-modal around $21,000 and $43,000. A comparison of these two 
income distributions shows that there has been a substantial hollowing-out of the 
middle of the distribution between $25,000 and $60,000 (the fraction in this range 
                                                           
11 Holding constant the bandwidth, kernel and evaluation points ensures that the overall 
distribution is equal to the weighted sum of estimated sub-distributions. To facilitate comparison 
of densities, we use the same evaluation points for all analyses. This choice precludes the use of 
adaptive bandwidths. For the full samples, the "optimal" bandwidth, which assumes that the 
underlying distribution is smooth, unimodal, and symmetric, is about 0.09, and this increases as we 
use subsamples. However, if these assumptions are not valid, then the estimated optimal 
bandwidth will tend to "over-smooth" the distribution and disguise localised peaks and troughs. As 
a partial check on the robustness of the results to the choice of bandwidth we have re-estimated 
some of the distributions using wider bandwidths and found the results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 10 
fell from 53.2% in 1983–86 to 44.6% in 1995–98), and increases in mass between 
$12,000–$25,000 (from 23.3% to 28.1%) and above $80,000 (from 7.7% to 
11.5%). These shifts are perhaps even more apparent from Figure 2b, which 
shows the estimated change in the density of the income distribution at each real 
income level y:
12 
  10 ˆˆ ˆ () () () f yf y f y ∆= − . (1b) 
Finally, note that the small peaks in the tails of the distributions in Figure 2a 
reflect the left- and right-censoring in the data. 
Figure 2a: Distribution of equivalised household gross income: 1983–86 
and 1995–98 
 
                                                           
12 In order to verify that the observed changes are not simply due to sampling variation, we 
calculated bootstrap standard errors of the kernel density estimates and the changes, using 100 
replications. The main changes observed were found to be statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Hyslop and Maré (2001) presents the same graphs with confidence interval bounds on the 
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Figure 2b: Changes in distribution between 1983–86 and 1995–98 
 
3.1  Decomposing changes in the income distribution 
We now turn to the second feature of the analytical framework, which 
is to provide a decomposition of the overall change in the distribution of 
household incomes due to various sets of factors. We adopt a sequential 
counterfactual approach to analysing the effects of each set of factors.
13 Each 
counterfactual involves either a reweighting of the sampling weights for each 
household (for household structure, socio-demographic attributes, and 
employment outcomes) or a rescaling of income (for NS and economic returns).
14 
The first and second columns in Table 2 summarise the adjustments made to the 
income or weight for each counterfactual, while the appendix contains further 
details of the constructions. The third column contains an informal summary 
statistic of the change in the equivalised income density between 1983–86 and 
1995–98 attributable to each factor. These statistics are based on the correlations 
                                                           
13 In order to examine the robustness of the results based on the particular sequential ordering 
chosen here, we have repeated the analysis for all possible orderings. The results are reported in 
Section 4. 
14 We use more or less the same set of covariates to generate the counterfactual distributions for 
the effects associated with changing attributes, employment and returns. The attributes and 
employment counterfactuals therefore rely on different non-linear effects of these covariates on the 
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between the actual density change and the (marginal) changes predicted by each 
factor. For each factor, it is the coefficient from the regression of that factor’s 
predicted marginal density change on the actual density change over the period. 
These measures have the attractive accounting feature that they sum to one across 
the set of explanatory (and unexplained) factors, so can be interpreted as the 
fraction of change attributable to each factor. 
 
To begin, note that the overall distribution of household income is 
simply the weighted average of the sub-distributions for each different household 
type, where each sub-distribution is weighted by the fraction of the population 
living in that group. That is, if wtj is the weighted fraction of individuals in 
household type j in period t,
15 and ftj(y) is the probability density of log 
equivalised income y for household type j in period t, then the overall household 






) ( ) (
j
tj tj t y f w y f  (2) 
In order to illustrate the contributions of the income distributions of the 
six household types to the overall distribution, we estimate the densities of 
equivalised income for each of the six household groups in 1983–86 and 1995–98, 
) ( ˆ y ftj , using the same bandwidth and kernel as described for the overall 
distribution in Equation (1a), and weight each by its sample fraction, wtj. Figures 
3a and 3b plot these weighted sub-distributions for the 1983–86 and 1995–98 
periods respectively, together with the overall distributions of household 
equivalised income (as shown in Figure 2a).
                                                           
15 The weighted fraction of households in household type j is simply the sum of the sampling 






θ , where Ntj is the number of type j households in 
period t.  
13 
Table 2: Counterfactual incomes and weights, and contributions to density 
change 
   
 
Distribution Income  Conditioning  Contribution  to 
   measure  weight  density  change 
        
 
1. Base period (t = 0)  y0i  θ0i 
 actual  distribution 
 
2. Changes in  y0i 
H
i 0 ˆ θ  = w1ji/w0ji.θ0i 0.176 
 household  type
(a) 
 
3. Changes in 
N
i y0 ˆ  = log(Y0i + (πi-1)
N
i Y0 ) 
H




4. Changes in 
N
i y0 ˆ  
XH
i 0 ˆ θ  =  ) ( ˆ 0i xj x ψ .
H
i 0 ˆ θ  0.092
 




5. Changes in 
N
i y0 ˆ  
EXH
i 0 ˆ θ  =  ) , ( ˆ 0 0 , | i i j x e x e ψ .
XH




6. Changes in 
RN
i y0 ˆ  = 
N
i y0 ˆ + ) ˆ ˆ ( 0 1 0 j j i X β β − ′  
EXH
i 0 ˆ θ  0.018 
 economic  returns
(e) 
 
7. Final period (t = 1)  y1i  θ1i 
 actual  distribution 
   
 
Notes: The entries in the first and second columns describe the income measures and weights used in constructing the 
kernel density estimates of the various income distributions, where Yti is the equivalised gross income of household i 
in period t, yti = log(Yti), and θti is the sampling weight for that household (equal to the household’s sampling weight 
multiplied by number of people in the household). Each household i has a household type j. The j subscript is 
suppressed except where household type is important. The entries in the third column are estimated as coefficients 
from regressions of the kernel density changes attributable to each factor on the total density changes between 1983–
86 and 1995–98. 
 
(a) wtj = ∑
∈ j H i
ti θ  is the weighted fraction of households in type j in period t. 
 
(b) πi = NS1i/ NS0i, where NSti is the rate of NS applicable to household i in period t; and  N
i Y0  is the actual 
NS income of household i in period 0–see text and Appendix for details. 
 
(c) The reweighting to adjust for changes in socio-demographic attributes (x) between period 0 and 1 is 
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i j , where Pj(.|x) is estimated using a Logit model for the period of observation 
and Pj(t = 1) is the fraction of the sample in period 1–see text and Appendix for details. 
 
(d) The reweighting to adjust for changes in employment outcomes between period 0 and period 1 is 
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0 ∑ , where Ptj(.|x) is estimated using an Ordered Logit model for the 
employment outcomes–see text and Appendix for details. 
 
(e)  tj β ˆ  are the estimated coefficients from median regressions of  N
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Figure 3a: Distribution of household incomes 1983–86: Contributions by 
household type 
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It is apparent from Figures 3a and 3b that, as well as the relative contributions 
of each household type varying according to the distribution of households, the 
equivalised income distributions across the household types also differ substantially. In 
particular, multiple-adult households tend to have higher equivalised incomes than 
single-adult households; households with children tend to have lower equivalised 
incomes than households without children—i.e. compare the multiple-adult households 
with and without children, and the single-adult households with and without children; 
and “over-60s” households tend to have lower incomes than “under-60s” households. 
Furthermore, the relative positions of the distributions for the different 
household types are suggestive of the explanations for the shape of the overall 
distribution of income. For example, although only 4% of individuals live in single-
over-60s households, in 1983–86 they are concentrated in the region of the left-most 
shoulder in the overall distribution, suggesting that NS for single people contributes 
strongly to this region. Similarly, the distribution for the multiple-over-60s households 
is concentrated around the second shoulder of the overall distribution, suggesting that 
NS for married couples contributes strongly to this region. Households at the main peak 
in the income distribution (around $25,000–$50,000) are mainly multiple-adult 
households (with and without children). The drop in the fraction of individuals in 
multiple adult households, together with the increasing dispersion in the equivalised 
income distributions of these households, contributes to the flattening out of the 
distribution in this range. 
The remainder of this section provides a general description of the methods 
that we use to decompose changes in the income distribution. A more detailed 
exposition of the methods used is included in the appendix. 
3.2  Changes in household structure 
The contribution of changes in the distribution of household types in the 
population to changes in the overall distribution of income depends on how changes in 
the distribution of households affect different points in the income distributions of the 
various household types. For example, the impact on the overall distribution of income 
will be different if the drop in two-parent families is due to a drop in low-income 
families rather than to a drop in high-income families. We adopt the neutral assumption 16 
that such change occurs randomly across the respective household-type distributions,
16 
which implies that the income distributions for each household type remain unchanged 
between 1983–86 and 1995–98. This counterfactual distribution involves simply 
reweighting the 1983–86 income distributions of each household type by the 1995–98 
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Figure 4a plots this counterfactual distribution together with the actual 1983–
86 distribution of equivalised income. The shape of these two distributions is very 
similar. The counterfactual distribution has somewhat less mass in the middle-income 
range than the actual distribution and greater mass in the lower-income range, reflecting 
the effects of the shift away from multiple-adult with children households towards sole-
parent and single-adult households over the period. Under this counterfactual, the 
observed changes in the household structure over the 1980s and 1990s would be 
expected to cause a downward shift in the distribution of income. We emphasise this 
effect in Figure 5a, which graphs the estimated difference between this counterfactual 
distribution and the actual 1983–86 distribution: 
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together with the estimated total difference between the actual 1983–86 and 1995–98 
distributions, described by Equation 1b. 
  Figures 4a and 5a suggest that the changing distribution of household types 
provides a partial and important explanation for the observed changes in the distribution 
of household income over the period. For example, the density changes attributable to 
changing household types account for 18% of the total density change (see Table 2). 
Given that the predicted shift is from the middle-income range to the left hand tail, this 
is likely to translate into an increase in income inequality. We return to this issue in the 
next section. First, we consider the effects of factors that might affect the distribution of 
income within household types. 
                                                           
16 If only the distribution of households in the population changed during the period, the income 
distribution for each household type would be unchanged and the counterfactual distribution for changes 
in the distribution of households would exactly match the actual distribution of income in 1995–98. We 
subsequently allow for changes in socio-demographic attributes and employment outcomes of 
households.  
17 
Figure 4: Counterfactual distributions 
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Figure 5: Counterfactual distribution changes 


























































































3.3  National Superannuation changes 
Given the apparent contribution of retired households to the two lower 
shoulders in the equivalised income distributions in Figures 2a and 2b, it is intuitive to 
consider the effects of changes in the statutory rates of NS.
17 Although in principle this 
analysis could be extended to all welfare benefits, other non-age related welfare benefits 
are less easily identified in the data, experienced a myriad of different rate changes, and 
play a less apparent role. 
The counterfactual distribution to take account of changes in the NS rates 
involves a translation of the income of households. First, we construct separate indexes 
for the statutory rates for singles and couples between 1983 and 1998 (adjusted for CPI 
ex-GST changes). Second, for each household in 1983–86, we adjust the NS component 
of income to the 1995–98 value, using the single-rate index if the household has a single 
person aged over 60, and the couple-rate index if the household has two or more 
members aged over 60.
18 We then compute the 1995–98 counterfactual total household 
income by adding this adjusted NS to the other actual income received by the household 
in 1983–86. This provides an estimate of the level of income the household would have 
received in 1995–98 given their 1983–86 NS and other incomes and the NS statutory-
rate changes over the period. Third, we estimate the kernel density of the overall 
counterfactual household equivalised income distribution,  ( ) y f
NH
0 ˆ , by weighting the 
household type counterfactual sub-distributions,  ( ) y f
N
j 0 ˆ , analogously to Equation 3a. 
The marginal change in the distribution explained by these statutory NS rate changes, 
conditional on changes in household types,  ( ) y f
N
0 ˆ ∆ , is estimated, analogously to 
Equation 3b, as the difference between  ( ) y f
NH
0 ˆ  and  ( ) y f
H
0 ˆ . 
                                                           
17 The impact of NS is much more apparent in the unequivalised household income distributions, where it 
contributes to two large spikes in the distributions corresponding to the single and couple rates. 
Furthermore, these spikes move in opposite directions over the period as the statutory National 
Superannuation rates for singles and couples changed by 5.8% and –5.4% respectively. That these spikes 
move in opposite directions suggests that the changes are not simply due to the CPI adjustment used. See 
Hyslop and Maré (2001) for the details of this analysis. 
18 As expected, the vast majority of NS is paid to “Single adult over 60” households and “Multiple adult 
over 60” households with just two members. However, a small fraction of households in the latter group 
have more than two members over 60 (0.9%). Similarly, a small fraction of working-age households, 
largely in the “multiple adults under 60” group, also receive NS (3.8%). 20 
Figure 4b shows the counterfactual distributions,  ( ) y f
NH
0 ˆ  and  () y f
H
0 ˆ , while 
Figure 5b shows the marginal change in the income distribution due to NS,  () y f
N
0 ˆ ∆ , 
together with the total change over the period. As expected, the effects of controlling for 
changes in NS are concentrated in the lower half of the income distribution, and 
generate a localised peak in the distribution in the affected region. Figure 5b shows that 
these changes contribute much of the distributional change around this spike. As this 
factor explains the bulk of the income distribution changes for the two “retired” 
household groups, we exclude these groups from the subsequent analyses. Using our 
informal measure of contribution, the density changes attributable to changing NS rates 
account for 10% of the total density change. 
3.4  Changes in socio-demographic attributes 
The third effect we consider is changes in the socio-demographic attributes of 
households. Changes in attributes allow us to control for non-random changes in 
observable characteristics within the distribution of household types over time, and may 
affect the distribution of income, irrespective of any changes in household structure. For 
example, human capital factors, such as education and experience, may directly affect 
individual incomes and hence the level of family or household income. Similarly, 
fertility decisions and other life cycle factors may affect labour supply choices and 
household income. Table 1 shows that there were increases in qualifications as well as 
average age during the period, the impact of which are picked up in this stage of the 
analysis. 
The counterfactual distribution for the effects of changing attributes is 
constructed as follows. For each of the four working-age household types, we estimate 
the relationship of how the household attributes vary between 1983–86 and 1995–98, 
adopting flexible specifications which vary across each household type. The attributes 
we use include the number, age, sex, ethnicity, and education levels of adults in the 
household, together with the numbers of children in various age groups.
19 This 
estimated relationship is used to adjust the 1983–86 households’ sampling weights to 
reflect the change in attributes in 1995–98: this reweighting gives greater weight to 
                                                           
19 Appendix tables A1(a)–A1(d) contain the estimation results for these specifications for each of the 
household types, together with those for the employment outcomes and economic returns discussed 
below.  
21 
1983–86 households with attributes more similar to those in 1995–98 and less weight to 
households whose attributes are less similar. For each household type, we construct a 
counterfactual distribution,  ( ) y f
XN
j 0 ˆ , using these attribute “reweights”, and then 
construct the counterfactual distribution for all households,  () y f
XNH
0 ˆ , as a weighted 
average of the household types counterfactual distributions, using final period 
household type shares w1j. The estimated marginal change in the distribution 
attributable to the change in attributes,  ( ) y f
X
0 ˆ ∆ , is the difference between the 
counterfactuals,  () y f
XNH
0 ˆ  and  ( ) y f
NH
0 ˆ . 
Figure 4c shows the counterfactual distributions which include and exclude 
changes in attributes,  () y f
XNH
0 ˆ  and  ( ) y f
NH
0 ˆ . Figure 5c displays the marginal effect of 
changing attributes on the equivalised income distribution,  ( ) y f
X
0 ˆ ∆ , together with the 
total change over the period.  Broadly speaking the observed changes in attributes are 
predicted to cause an upward shift in mass in the income distribution. For example, 
there is a (net) drop in individuals with household equivalised incomes in the $12,000–
$47,000 range, balanced by a net gain in the proportion of individuals with equivalised 
income above $56,000. As the shift in mass predominantly occurs from the middle to 
the right hand tail of the distribution, the changing socio-demographic characteristics of 
households is likely to cause an increase in income inequality. The density changes 
attributable to changing household attributes account for 9% of the total density change. 
3.5 Employment  outcomes 
Given that the majority of individual and household income comes from 
labour earnings, the employment outcomes of individuals and their households has a 
major impact on the distribution of household equivalised income. Furthermore, the 
dramatic changes in employment that occurred during the late 1980s suggest that the 
changes in employment may have important implications for the observed changes in 
the distribution of income. We investigate these issues as follows. 
For working-age households, we categorise employment outcomes into either 
three (for single-adult households) or five (for multiple-adult households) discrete 22 
groups on the basis of the number of full-time and part-time workers in the household.
20 
Ordered logit models for the relationship between the employment outcome and 
household attributes are then estimated separately for each period and each household 
type. We predict the employment outcome of each 1983–86 household given its set of 
attributes using the estimated 1983–86 and 1995–98 relationships, and adjust the 1983–
86 weights to take account of the changes in employment outcomes that occurred over 
the period. Analogously to attributes, this reweighting gives more weight to 1983–86 
households with employment outcomes that are more similar to the 1995–98 outcomes 
as predicted by their attributes, and less weight to households with outcomes less 
similar to 1995–98. The counterfactual distribution for all households,  () y f
EXNH
0 ˆ , is 
equal to the (w1j) weighted average of the household type counterfactuals,  () y f
EXN
j 0 ˆ , 
estimated using the employment and attribute “re-weights”. The estimated marginal 
change in the distribution attributable to employment changes,  ( ) y f
E
0 ˆ ∆ , is the difference 
between  () y f
EXNH
0 ˆ  and  () y f
XNH
0 ˆ . 
Figure 4d shows the counterfactual distributions,  ( ) y f
EXNH
0 ˆ  and  () y f
XNH
0 ˆ , 
while Figure 5d displays the marginal effect of changing employment outcomes on the 
income distribution,  () y f
E
0 ˆ ∆ , together with the total change in the equivalised income 
distribution over the period. Reflecting the predominant drop in employment over the 
sample period, these figures highlight the broad downward shift in mass from the top to 
the bottom half of the distribution. The density changes attributable to the changes in 
household employment account for 20% of the total density change. 
3.6  Economic returns to attributes 
The final factor we consider is that of changes in the “economic returns” to 
attributes over the period. For example, Dixon (1998) and Maani (1999) document 
increases in the earnings premia associated with qualifications between the mid 1980s 
and the mid 1990s. This likely increased the dispersion in individual incomes and, with 
                                                           
20 Appendix Table A2 describes the employment-outcome grouping for each household type, together 
with the distributions of outcomes in the three periods 1983–86, 1989–92, and 1995–98.  As indicated by 
Table 1, there was a broad shift from full-time employment to part-time and unemployed between 1983–
86 and 1989–92, followed by a partial employment recovery by 1995–98.  
23 
positive assortive matching of couples,
21 would increase the dispersion in household 
incomes. 
To adjust the distribution of income to take account of changes in the returns 
to attributes we begin by estimating specifications for log income in terms of the sets of 
socio-demographic attributes described above, separately for each household type and 
period.
22 Each 1983–86 household’s equivalised income is adjusted using the predicted 
income change between 1983–86 and 1995–98 given its set of attributes using these 
estimated specifications. We then construct the counterfactual distribution,  ( ) y f
REXNH
0 ˆ , 
equal to the weighted average of the household type counterfactuals which incorporate 
this changed income,  () y f
REXN
j 0 ˆ . The marginal change in the distribution due to changes 
in the economic returns to attributes,  ( ) y f
R
0 ˆ ∆ , is the difference between  () y f
REXNH
0 ˆ  and 
() 0 ˆ EXNH f y . 
Figure 4e shows the counterfactual distributions,  () y f
REXNH
0 ˆ  and  ( ) y f
EXNH
0 ˆ , 
while Figure 5e displays the marginal effect of changes in the returns on the income 
distribution  ( ) y f
R
0 ˆ ∆  together with the total change in the actual distribution over the 
period. These figures suggest there has been little systematic effect of changes in the 
returns to the socio-demographic characteristics of households over this period on the 
household income distribution, and the density changes attributable to changing returns 
account for only 2% of the total density change over the period. 
3.7  Summary of explained changes 
Figure 4f shows the final counterfactual density,  ( ) y f
REXNH
0 ˆ , together with the 
actual 1983–86 distribution of household income; Figure 5f shows the total change 
explained by these factors (the difference between the final counterfactual and 1983–86 
densities) together with the total change over the period (Equation 1b). These factors 
appear to provide a reasonable account of the downwards-shifting mass, but less of the 
                                                           
21 For example, see Callister (2001). 
22 As our objective here is to translate the distribution, and in order to minimise the effect of possible 
outliers, we use Median (Quantile) regression techniques rather than least squares regression. We omit 
from the regression estimation any households with either left or right censored log equivalised income, 
however we adjust the actual (uncensored) incomes of these individuals before recensoring the adjusted 
log equivalised income at seven and 12.25. The 1983–86 log income measure we use is that which has 
already been adjusted for statutory changes in NS, as described above. 24 
upwards-shifting mass, in the distribution. Collectively, this set of explanatory factors 
account for about 60% of the total density change.
23 
There are several possible reasons for the unexplained changes in the higher 
income ranges. First, these may be related to changes in the intensity of employment 
over the period—e.g, Dixon (1998) documents a large increase in the numbers of hours 
worked by workers over the late 1980s and early 1990s, and that the increase is 
positively correlated with wages. To the extent such changes are uncorrelated with the 
observable socio-demographic characteristics of households, this may contribute to the 
increase in the fraction of high-income households. The lack of any discernible 
distributional effects associated with changes in returns to attributes suggests that this 
may be true. Closely related to this last point is that there may have been changes in 
returns to unobservable characteristics that are orthogonal to the set of observable 
attributes. A third reason for the unexplained changes in the top half of the income 
distribution may be related to factors driving changes in unearned income—e.g. the 
introduction of a fringe benefit tax in 1985 led to a substitution away from in-kind 
remuneration towards cash remuneration, which would have increased incomes most for 
high income earners. 
4  Implications for changes in income inequality 
between 1983–86 and 1995–98 
In this section we use the counterfactual distributions of income discussed in 
the last section to estimate the contribution of each set of explanatory factors to various 
measures of equivalised income inequality over the period. Table 3 summarises the 
effects on the levels of inequality of these factors. First, in panel A we present the 10th, 
25th, 50th (median), 75th, and 90th percentiles of the income distribution for the two 
actual and five counterfactual distributions. These percentiles provide a quantitative 
summary of the various distributions, and comparing adjacent columns of the table 
indicates the estimated marginal effects of the various factors on the distributions 
observed in Figure 4. 
The results in columns one and two confirm that changing household 
structure tended to lower the bottom end and raise the top end of the income 
                                                           
23 That is, the sum of the regression coefficients of the explained density changes on the total density 
change is 0.59 (see Table 2).  
25 
distribution: equivalised income fell by about 5% (from $17,365 to $16,573) at the 10th 
percentile and 6% at the 25th percentile, was roughly constant at the median, and 
increased by 1% at both the 75th and 90th percentiles. Despite the effect of changes in 
NS rates on the distribution, apparent in Figures 4b and 5b, the effect was localised and 
had very little impact on the percentiles here (see column three). The changes in 
household socio-demographic attributes (column four) tended to raise the distribution of 
income, particularly at higher incomes: equivalised income increased by between 1% at 
the 10th percentile, and 8% at the 75th percentile of the distribution. The estimated 
effects of changing employment outcomes (column five) are to lower incomes by 3–6% 
at each of the five percentiles, while the estimated change in returns to attributes 
(column six) raises equivalised income by between 2% and 6% at the various 
percentiles. Finally, comparing columns six and seven shows the unexplained changes: 
broadly speaking, the combined factors examined here appear to provide a reasonable 
account of the observed changes in the distribution at these percentiles. 
In panel B of Table 3, for each of the distributions in panel A we show five 
summary measures of inequality commonly used in the literature. These are the Gini 
coefficient, the standard deviation of log income (SD), the interquartile range of log 
income (IQR), and the log differences between the 90th and 50th (90–50) and the 50th 
and 10th (50–10) percentiles of the distribution. Comparing adjacent columns provides 
a similar interpretation as for the percentiles in panel A.
24 Table 4 summarises the 
marginal effect of each factor on the change in these inequality measures over the 
period. As the decomposition of changes in inequality is carried out sequentially, the 
results are potentially sensitive to the sequence order. The first row in each panel 
contains the marginal relative change due to each of the factors in the order discussed in 
the last section. To gauge the robustness of the results to the sequence order, we have 
also repeated the analysis for all possible orderings, and summarise the range of effects 
for each measure in rows 2–5 of each block of Table 4.
25 
                                                           
24 Bootstrap standard errors for each of the statistics are shown in brackets. These are based on 100 
replications where, for each replication, a full set of counterfactual estimates were generated and 
inequality measures calculated. 
25 Taking the mean of these different orderings is equivalent to a so-called Shapley decomposition (see 
Shorrocks, 1999). 26 
Table 3: Implications for measures of income inequality 
   
  Actual    Counterfactual Distribution Allowing Changes in   Actual 
 1983-86  Household  +National  +Household  +Employment  +Economic  1995-98 
 Distribution  Structure  Superannuation  Attributes Outcomes  Returns  Distribution 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
   
 
A:  Percentiles of the equivalised income distribution 
10th  17,365 16,573 16,582 16,852 15,983 16,894  16,746 
25th  24,352 23,696 23,545 24,334 22,897 23,307  22,316 
50th  36,495 36,370 36,363 38,334 36,049 37,038  35,703 
75th  53,599 54,228 54,241 58,374 54,886 57,154  57,366 
90th  74,329 75,357 75,295 80,081 77,688 80,611  83,405 
 
B:  Summary measures of equivalised income inequality 
Gini  0.316 0.324 0.324 0.334 0.341 0.340  0.367 
 (.002)  (.002)  (.002)    (.003) (.004) (.005)    (.003) 
SD  0.691 0.699 0.699 0.736 0.732 0.730  0.762 
 (.010)  (.009)  (.009)  (.013) (.015) (.016)  (.010) 
IQR  0.789 0.828 0.835 0.875 0.874 0.897  0.944 
 (.009)  (.009)  (.010)  (.010) (.018) (.021)  (.012) 
90–50  0.711 0.729 0.728 0.737 0.768 0.778  0.848 
 (.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.011) (.017) (.020)  (.014) 
50–10  0.743 0.786 0.785 0.822 0.813 0.785  0.757 
 (.008)  (.010)  (.010)  (.015) (.020) (.019)  (.012) 
   
Notes: In panel A, the percentiles are in constant (1999) dollar values. In panel B, bootstrap standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. Gini is the Gini coefficient of income; SD is the standard deviation of 
log(income); IQR is the Interquartile range of log(income); 90–50 is the difference between the 90th and 
50th percentiles of the log(income) distribution; and 50–10 is the difference between the 50th and 10th 
percentiles of the log(income) distribution. 
  
27 
Table 4: Contributions to change in inequality, 1983–86 to 1995–98 
   
 
    Marginal relative change attributable to   
 Household  NS  Attributes  Employment Returns  Explained 
 types   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
 
Gini (Total Change = 15.9%; se = 1.3) 
Primary  order 15.4  0.9 18.8 13.7  -1.4  47.4 
  (1.6) (0.2) (4.0) (4.9)  (9.3)  (9.3) 
Mean  14.7  0.9 17.0 18.0 -5.7 44.8 
Median  15.4  0.9 17.8 18.3 -6.2 46.9 
Min  11.6  0.5  9.5 13.7  -12.6 37.3 
Max  18.6  1.1 24.0 22.7  3.7 51.8 
 
SD (Total Change = 10.3%; se = 2.0) 
Primary order  11.5  0.1  51.7  -5.7  -2.0  55.6 
  (3.6)  (0.4) (16.6) (12.7)  (11.5)  (22.1) 
Mean  9.6  0.1 62.9 -3.7  -15.4 53.5 
Median  9.9  0.1 62.8 -3.6  -16.4 56.1 
Min  2.1 -0.4 48.3 -9.8  -30.1 36.4 
Max  17.9  0.3 79.3  5.9 -0.1 73.2 
 
IQR (Total Change = 19.7%; se = 1.8) 
Primary order  25.1  4.3  26.1  -0.5  14.7  69.6 
  (3.3) (1.5) (4.4) (9.4)  (15.6)  (12.8) 
Mean  25.5  4.5 23.2 11.1 -4.9 59.4 
Median  25.6  4.2 24.6  8.6 -7.2 59.2 
Min 15.1  -2.9  6.1  -2.8  -24.3  48.5 
Max  32.8 12.7 33.5 36.1 15.0 70.6 
 
90–50 (Total Change = 19.3%; se = 2.4) 
Primary order  12.5  -0.5  6.5  22.7  7.2  48.4 
 (2.9)  (0.7)  (6.9)  (11.0)  (18.0)  (15.1) 
Mean  15.2 0.4 1.5  32.1 0.1  49.3 
Median  14.2 0.3 5.7  32.2 3.9  48.2 
Min  10.6  -3.2 -22.4  18.4 -17.0  41.0 
Max  27.2  4.1 27.1 42.4 18.5 59.7 
 
50–10 (Total Change = 1.9%; se = 2.0) 
Primary order  301.5  -5.2  255.1  -59.3  -197.6  294.6 
  (4884)  (199) (5122) (2385)  (10683)  (3728) 
Mean  184.9 -18.4 376.8 -72.1  -337.8 133.3 
Median 181.5  -15.9  391.1  -59.2  -294.6  78.4 
Min  2.2 -101.2  137.5 -287.1 -586.8  -94.1 
Max  441.2  20.5 589.0 150.8  -140.0 423.1 
   
Notes: All table entries are expressed as percentages of the total change. The “Primary order” 
results are derived from Table 3, with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. All other results 
are based on the 120 possible orderings of the five sets of factors. Gini is the Gini coefficient of 
income; SD is the standard deviation of log(income); IQR is the interquartile range of 
log(income); 90–50 is the difference between the 90th and 50th percentiles of the log(income) 
distribution; and 50–10 is the difference between the 50th and 10th percentiles of the log(income) 
distribution. 28 
There are several points to note from Table 3, panel B and Table 4. 
First, the increase in (actual) inequality varies according to the measure of 
inequality, reflecting both that the increase in dispersion in incomes was not even 
across the distribution and that each measure weights changes differently. For 
example, the Gini coefficient gives similar weight to changes in income at 
different points in the distribution, whereas SD is more sensitive to changes in the 
tails of the distribution.
26 Likewise, the 90–50 and 50–10 measures capture only 
changes in the upper and lower half of the distribution respectively, while the IQR 
summarises changes in the “shoulders” of the distribution. Over the period the 
Gini coefficient increased by 16%, SD by 10%, IQR by 20%, the 90–50 
difference 19%, and the 50–10 difference by 2%. Because the change in the 50–10 
difference is small and statistically insignificant, the factor-specific contributions 
in Table 4 are sensitive to sampling variation: for this reason, we largely ignore 
changes in the 50–10 difference in the subsequent discussion.
27 
Second, the factor-specific contributions vary across the inequality 
measures, although changes in household structure and socio-demographic 
attributes tend to provide the largest marginal contributions to the change in 
inequality. For the primary ordering, household structure changes contribute about 
15% of the increase in the Gini, 12% of the increases in SD and the 90–50 
difference, 25% of the increase in the IQR, and 13% of the increase in the 90–50 
difference over the period. Socio-demographic attribute changes explain between 
7% of the increase in the 90–50 difference and about one-half of the increase in 
SD. Somewhat surprisingly, employment changes account for less of the change 
in inequality, except in the 90–50 difference, where this factor provides the single 
largest contribution (23%) to the increase in the top half of the distribution. 
Finally, the results in Table 4 support the earlier graphical finding that changes in 
the returns to household attributes had little systematic effect on income inequality 
over this period: the only statistically significant contribution of the returns was to 
the change in SD, and changing returns acted to reduce this measure of inequality. 
                                                           
26 See Burniaux et al (1998) for a more general discussion. 
27 A more robust way to understand the causes of changes in the lower half of the distribution is to 
examine the relevant percentiles in panel A of Table 3.  
29 
Collectively, the factors considered account for around one-half of the 
increase in the Gini, SD and the 90–50 difference, and two-thirds of the increase 
in the IQR. These fractions are broadly similar to those for the density change 
estimated in the previous section, and represent significant contributions to the 
observed increase in inequality over the sample period. 
Finally, although the order of decomposition does affect the estimated 
contribution of each factor, the general pattern of findings noted here does not 
change. For example, the mean and median values of the 120 orderings are 
generally close to estimates from the primary ordering–e.g. the mean and median 
lie within one standard error of the primary ordering estimate for 26 of the 30 
marginal effects. The discrepancies tend to be slightly larger for the later factors 
in the primary ordering (employment and returns). 
4.1  Robustness to alternative equivalisation, income and 
weight measures 
Thus far, the analysis of income inequality changes has been in terms of 
changes in equivalised gross household income, weighted to represent individuals. 
The choices of equivalisation, income and weight may each have non-trivial 
implications for the results. For this reason, we now examine the robustness of the 
results across a range of alternative measures, which emphasise different aspects 
of distributional change. We restrict our attention to five alternatives, across three 
equivalence scales—the Luxembourg (0.5) equivalence scale used above, the per 
capita equivalisation, and unequivalised for household composition; three income 
measures—gross, estimated post-tax, and estimated disposable (i.e. post-tax and 
rebates);
28 and three weights—person weights, equivalised person weights, and 
household weights.
29 In particular, we examine per capita gross income weighted 
                                                           
28 We estimate household post-tax income as the sum of individuals’ post-tax income, which is 
calculated using the income tax scale during the tax year in which they were surveyed and applied 
to their reported gross income. We estimate household disposable income using the “household 
cash disposable income” measure estimated from the NZ Treasury’s TAXMOD model for income 
tax and rebates for the 1995–98 period. TAXMOD is only operational for the 1987/88 and 
subsequent tax years. For this reason, for the 1983–86 period we estimate household disposable 
income using the income tax scale applied to individual incomes just described, together with an 
estimate of the major income and family tax rebates, applied on the assumption that the household 
can be treated as a family for tax purposes. 
29 Equivalised household income weighted to represent equivalised persons, per capita income 
weighted to represent persons, and household income weighted to represent households each has 
the property that they aggregate to total household income. 30 
to represent individuals, equivalised gross income weighted to represent 
equivalised persons, equivalised post-tax income weighted to represent 
individuals, equivalised disposable income weighted to represent individuals, and 
unequivalised gross household income weighted to represent households.
30  
Table 5 summarises the implications for changes in inequality based on 
these five alternatives together with the Luxembourg equivalised gross household 
income weighted to represent individuals. Table 5 includes five panels (A–E) 
which correspond to the five alternative measures of inequality that we considered 
earlier. The first row in each panel presents the relative change in inequality 
between 1983–86 and 1995–98, using each of the alternative income measures. 
Subsequent rows contain the relative contributions to the change in inequality 
from each set of factors, using each of the alternative income measures. 
The measured increase in inequality tends to be larger using the post-
tax and disposable income measures, and lower using the per capita income 
measure. This is consistent with the reduction in the top marginal tax rate from 
60% to 33% during the period. Also, although the factor contributions are 
reasonably comparable across the income measures, the contributions using post-
tax and disposable incomes are generally lower than for other income measures, 
possibly because the tax rate changes were largely unrelated to the factors 
considered in our counterfactuals. For example, the explained fractions of the 
increase in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient are only one-quarter 
using equivalised post-tax income, and less than one-fifth using equivalised 
disposable income, versus 40–60% using the gross income measures. Overall, 
given the range of concepts considered, we believe the results are remarkably 
similar across these alternative measures. 
                                                           
30 A detailed analysis of unequivalised gross household income weighted to represent households 
is presented in Hyslop and Maré (2001).  
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Table 5: Robustness to alternative income and weight measures 
   
 
Equivalisation: Equivalised Per capita  Equivalised  Equivalised Equivalised  Unequivalised 
Income: Gross  Gross  Gross  Post-tax  Disposable  Gross 
Weight: Person  Person  Equiv-person Person  Person  Household 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
 
A: Gini coefficient 
Relative  change  15.9 13.0 15.7 20.9 18.8 14.8 
Contributions by: 
Household  types  15.4 12.2 14.4 12.6 11.4 17.7 
NS  0.9 3.0 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 
Attributes  18.8 15.7 19.6 10.9 15.1 17.1 
Employment  13.7  21.7  15.3 7.8 5.1 8.4 
Returns  -1.4 -6.1 -9.6 -5.5  -15.2 -2.0 
Explained  47.4 53.5 59.7 26.5 17.1 40.5 
 
B: Standard deviation of log(income) 
Relative  change  10.3  9.7  9.9 11.8 12.8  8.9 
Contributions by: 
Household  types  11.5 16.9 11.1 10.8  5.4 14.3 
NS  0.1 1.4  -0.6  -0.1 0.0  -6.5 
Attributes  51.7 38.1 52.3 40.0 39.5 47.2 
Employment  -5.7  5.7  1.4 -7.6 -9.9  2.0 
Returns  -2.0 -14.2 -18.8 -15.4 -22.6  -4.6 
Explained  55.6 52.2 54.7 27.7 12.4 52.3 
 
C: Interquartile range 
Relative  change  19.7 14.2 18.4 21.7 15.5 14.9 
Contributions by: 
Household  types  25.1 32.4 24.9 29.0 32.0 32.8 
NS  4.3 5.5 6.4 5.5 5.4 6.8 
Attributes  26.1 24.0 28.0 14.0 26.8 34.1 
Employment –0.5  6.8  7.0  -0.4 -14.1  3.5 
Returns 14.7  -6.0  -10.3  0.9  -16.6  -19.4 
Explained  69.6 37.2 43.9 49.1 33.6 57.8 
 
D: 90–50 difference 
Relative  change  19.3 12.2 20.2 21.6 18.6 26.3 
Contributions by: 
Household  types  12.5 18.2  8.9 13.2 14.5 15.3 
NS  -0.5  -1.3  -0.2 0.5 2.2 0.6 
Attributes  6.5 27.7 10.3 10.2 12.4  9.1 
Employment  22.7 42.4 22.9 13.1 12.6 15.5 
Returns 7.2  -14.4  18.4  16.0  -1.3  2.8 
Explained  48.4 27.4 39.7 52.9 40.4 43.3 
 
E: 50–10 difference 
Relative  change  1.9 4.2 0.5 3.1 2.1  -3.7 
   
Notes: The first row entries in each panel are the percentage increases in inequality between 
1983–86 and 1995–98; the entries in the subsequent rows are the percentage contribution by each 
set of factors. As the 50–10 relative changes are all small, we do not report the factor 
contributions. 
 32 
4.2  Changes in the household type distributions of 
equivalised income 
We now summarise the results of the analysis for changes in the sub-
distributions of income for each of the six household types described above. This 
analysis provides a sense of how changes in the overall distribution of household 
income are attributable to changes in the distribution within the various household 
types. The discussion in this section focuses on the summary measures of 
inequality, as summarised in Table 6. The first column contains the actual change 
in each measure of inequality over the period together with the relative change in 
parentheses, while subsequent columns contain the relative marginal contribution 
of each factor. These results provide further evidence on the complexity of the 
changing distribution of household incomes over this period. 
First, there were quite diverse changes in income inequality across the 
various household types. With the exception of the “single adult with children” 
households, there were strong increases in income inequality for the working-age 
households. For example, the Gini coefficient increased by about 20% for each of 
these three groups. In contrast, the level of inequality among “single adult with 
children” households actually fell: by 19% for the Gini, and between 5 and 25% 
using other measures.  
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Table 6: Changes in income inequality 1983–86 to 1995–98, by household 
types 
   
 
  Total    Relative marginal effect of changes in   
 change  in  NS Household  Employment  Economic  Explained 
 inequality    attributes  outcomes  returns  change 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
   
 
A: Single adult over 60 
Gini 0.003  (0.9)  -288.7  ---  ---  ---  -288.7 
SD -0.007  (-1.5)  212.4  ---  ---  ---  212.4 
IQR -0.055  (-11.0)  13.3  ---  ---  ---  13.3 
90–50 -0.067  (-7.8)  20.3  ---  ---  ---  20.3 
50–10 -0.016  (-9.9)  128.5  ---  ---  ---  128.5 
 
B: Multiple adults over 60 
Gini 0.028  (9.4)  29.6  ---  ---  ---  29.6 
SD 0.072  (14.6)  19.1  ---  ---  ---  19.1 
IQR -0.068  (-9.4)  -32.5  ---  ---  ---  -32.5 
90–50 0.090  (10.9)  41.7  ---  ---  ---  41.7 
50–10 -0.027  (-7.7)  -26.6  ---  ---  ---  -26.6 
 
C: Single adult under 60 
Gini 0.053  (16.3)  0.0  6.4  52.6  21.7  80.7 
SD 0.013  (1.6)  -0.2  199.5  552.0  59.2  810.5 
IQR  0.276  (37.0)  0.0 21.5 43.9 33.5 98.8 
90–50 0.182  (28.2)  0.0  -22.4  28.2  25.0  30.8 
50–10 -0.030  (-2.8)  0.0  -302.9  111.1  30.9  -160.9 
 
D: Multiple adults under 60 
Gini 0.062  (25.1)  0.0  4.1  32.4  -1.0  35.5 
SD  0.149  (26.1) -0.1 29.4 28.0  0.4 57.7 
IQR 0.113  (19.3)  2.0  -7.3  63.5  -17.8  40.5 
90–50 0.141  (30.1)  0.0  -0.7  24.2  17.6  41.1 
50–10  0.236  (37.3) -0.8 15.8 41.5  -19.2 37.2 
 
E: Single adult with children 
Gini -0.057  (-18.9)  0.1  -27.8  55.3  26.6  54.2 
SD -0.031  (-5.5)  -0.5  -145.5  132.8  109.6  96.4 
IQR -0.101  (-23.1)  3.3  -73.9  86.3  73.9  89.6 
90–50 -0.162  (-24.5)  0.0  -72.7  126.0  27.9  81.2 
50–10 -0.087  (-19.9)  0.0  -14.7  17.2  -85.8  -83.2 
 
F: Multiple adults with children 
Gini  0.063  (21.9)  0.0 14.1 14.1 32.9 61.1 
SD  0.080  (11.7)  0.0 39.1  -21.9 43.8 61.0 
IQR  0.170  (26.7) -0.6 14.7 10.5 23.2 47.8 
90–50  0.148  (24.7) -0.3 16.8 22.3 30.5 69.3 
50–10 0.068  (9.8)  1.0  32.6  -7.8  87.7  113.6 
   
Notes: The numbers in column (1) are raw changes (with percentage changes in parentheses). The 
numbers in columns (2)–(6) are percentages of the total change. 
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Second, although changing employment outcomes had a comparatively 
modest effect on changing inequality at the aggregate level, this factor had the 
strongest effect on inequality changes within each household type. For example, 
employment changes account for 53%, 32% and 14% of the increase in the Gini 
for single-adult, multiple-adult, and multiple adult with children households 
respectively, and 55% of the decrease among single adult with children 
households. The difference in the importance of employment changes in the 
household type and aggregate analyses is because employment changes for high-
income households (multiple adults with children and multiple adults under the 
age of 60, which account for more than one-half and 20–25% of households 
respectively) lead to a “spreading down” of the distribution, compressing the 
overall distribution and counterbalancing the increase in inequality from within 
household types. In contrast, the changes in returns also contributed significantly 
to the changes in inequality within the single-adult household groups. 
Third, the changes for the “retired” household types are less consistent 
across measures. For example, the Gini coefficient and standard deviation of log 
income measures of inequality were static for singles and increased 9 and 15% 
respectively for multiple adult households, while the IQR and 50–10 difference 
measures decreased (by 8 to 11%), and the 90–50 difference increased 11% for 
multiple-adult households but decreased 8% for singles. As expected, NS changes 
contribute significantly to these changes. However, there are apparently other 
factors at work, particularly in the case of the multiple-adult households. For 
example, although the IQR and 50–10 difference fell, the effects of NS changes 
acted to increase these measures. Although we haven’t examined other factors for 
these groups, given the increasing age of eligibility, employment effects plausibly 
contribute to the changes for this group. 
4.3  Sub-period changes in the distribution of household 
incomes 
As we observed in Section 2, most of the changes appear to have 
occurred during the late 1980s. In particular, the dramatic increase in Gini 
coefficients, the shift in the distribution of household types, and the drop in 
employment were concentrated in this period. To examine the effects of changes 
in the sets of factors over the 1980s and 1990s, we repeat the analysis described in  
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Section 3, applied to the two sub-periods from 1983–86 to 1989–92, and from 
1989–92 to 1995–98. For each sub-period, we decompose changes relative to the 
initial period. 
Figure 6 presents the household equivalised income distributions across 
these two sub-periods, and the total and explained changes.
31 Comparing Figures 
6a and 6b, and Figures 6c and 6d, confirms that most of the change in the income 
distribution occurred during the 1980s. The hollowing out of the middle-income 
range, and the redistribution to the low and high ends of the distribution, occurred 
mainly between 1983–86 and 1989–92. Figure 6c suggests that the various sets of 
factors again provide a reasonable account of the downward shifts from the 
middle to the low end of the income distribution, while the upward shift is again 
less well explained. Between 1989–92 and 1995–98, the main change appears to 
be a downwards shift in mass around the middle of the distribution, although there 
is also a discernible increase in density at the top end of the distribution. Figure 6d 
shows that these changes are partially explained by the factors we focus on. 
 
                                                           
31 The full set of figures corresponding to the various counterfactuals is included in Hyslop and 
Maré (2001). 36 
Figure 6: Distribution of household gross incomes 



































12359 1 5 2 6 4 5 7 7 1 3 1
Explained
Total Change














Table 7 summarises the decomposition in the alternative measures of 
inequality attributable to the various sets of factors over the two sub-periods.   
Depending on the inequality measure used, between about one-half and 70% of the 
increase in inequality occurred during the first sub-period from 1983–86 to 1989–92. 
The results for this period tell a consistent story to that for the full period shown in 
Table 4 and Table 5. Changes in household structure and attributes again provide 
significant contributions to the change in inequality, although employment changes also 
play a large part over this period. The greater contribution of employment changes to 
changes in inequality is because the employment loss in the 1980s served to increase 
inequality, whereas the employment gain in the 1990s acted to reduce inequality. This is 
apparent in panel B, where employment changes tended to contribute negatively over 




The predicted effect of changes in the return to attributes is to reduce 
inequality in each sub-period, and thus contributes negatively to the observed increases. 
The results also indicate that the sets of factors considered tend to account for a larger 
fraction of the increase in inequality over the 1980s than the 1990s. 
Table 7: Sub-period changes in income inequality 
   
 
  Actual    Relative change in inequality attributable to   
 change  Household  NS  Attributes Employment  Returns Explained 
   t y p e s        c h a n g e  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
   
 
A:  1983–86 to 1989–92 
Gini  0.031 17.7  1.5 13.5 30.5  -12.9  50.2 
 [60.9]  (9.7) 
SD  0.039 6.2 1.2  54.3 2.9  -19.6  45.1 
 [54.0]  (5.6) 
IQR  0.112 23.3  3.3 16.8 18.1  -11.1  50.4 
 [72.4] (14.2) 
90–50  0.063 25.2 -1.4 -2.8 64.2 -2.8  82.3 
 [46.1]  (8.9) 
50–10  0.023 79.8  1.5 84.8 12.1  -236.5  -58.2 
  [158.1]  (3.1) 
 
B:  1989–92 to 1995–98 
Gini 0.020  9.8  -0.1  33.1  -6.3  -4.3  32.2 
 (5.7) 
SD 0.033  15.4  -1.1  57.0  -3.2  -17.4  50.6 
 (4.5) 
IQR 0.043  39.2  6.6  32.9  -20.5  -23.7  31.5  
 (4.8) 
90–50 0.074  11.6  2.6  11.8  2.4  -6.3  22.1 
 (9.5) 
50–10 -0.008  -157.8  29.2  -380.7  135.9  202.8  -170.7 
 (-1.1) 
   
Notes: The numbers in square brackets in panel A are the fractions of the change in inequality over the 
full period (1983–86 to 1995–98) that occurred in the first sub-period (1983–86 to 1989–92). Column (1) 
presents the actual change in inequality over each sub-period (together with the percentage change in 
parentheses). Columns (2)–(7) present the marginal change explained by each counterfactual as a 
percentage of the total change. 
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5 Concluding  discussion 
The semiparametric analysis of changes in the distribution of 
equivalised household income in New Zealand between 1983 and 1998 presented 
above provides both a visual appreciation of the levels and changes in the 
distribution, and a more informative analysis than that based on summary 
measures of inequality alone or on changes in mean incomes. As has been 
documented in other research, we find that the sizeable increase in inequality was 
concentrated during the late 1980s. However, our analysis shows that the changes 
in the distribution of income involved a complex set of factors which are difficult 
to summarise using a single measure of inequality. We find that the main factors 
contributing to the change in inequality were changes in household structure and 
changes in the socio-demographic attributes of households, which each explain 
one-sixth of the total increase in the Gini coefficient over the period, and up to 
one-quarter and one-half respectively of other measures of inequality. In contrast, 
we find that the large changes in the employment outcomes of households had a 
more modest impact on overall income inequality, although these changes do have 
a large effect on the observed change in inequality within household types. We 
also find little evidence of any systematic effects of changes in the economic 
returns to socio-demographic attributes on the income distribution or inequality 
over the period. These results are qualitatively robust to a variety of alternative 
equivalisation, income, and weighting measures. 
The study was motivated by the coincidence of increasing inequality in 
New Zealand and widespread economic and social policy reform during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Although it is not possible to attribute distributional 
changes to particular policy measures, our analysis and findings do provide some 
guidance for understanding the nature of the impact of the reforms, and the 
relative importance of different sets of reforms. First, the fact that the main 
increase in inequality occurred during the late 1980s rules out the 1991 
Employment Contracts Act and benefit reforms as primary causes of change, as 
has been claimed by some commentators. The most significant reforms during this 
period were the removal of subsidies to industry, trade protection, and the reform 
of the public sector. The most likely way in which these reforms affected 
inequality is through employment effects associated with job loss in affected  
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industries. Overall, our results suggest that this factor may have contributed up to 
20% of the observed increase in inequality over the full period, although a larger 
fraction over the late 1980s. Second, the significant roles played by changes in 
household structure and the socio-demographic attributes of households suggest 
that secular changes in, for example, population ageing, family structure 
preferences, and education and qualification levels, were major drivers of the 
increase in inequality; although arguably some of these changes may have been in 
response to the changing environment brought about by the reforms. 40 
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Appendix A:   Construction of counterfactual 
distributions 
In this appendix we provide details of the counterfactual distributions 
constructed to analyse changes in the distribution of household equivalised 
income between period 0 and period 1. The description of the analysis is 
analogous to that presented in DiNardo et al (1996), while Silverman (1986) 
provides a detailed account of kernel density estimation. This involves a 
combination of conditionally translating and reweighting empirical distributions 
to take account of changes in the various sets of factors of interest. 
Household types 
The estimated density of log household equivalised income in period t, 
) ( ˆ y ft , can be expressed as the weighted average density across the J distinct 
household types,  ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ
1
y f w y f tj
J
j
tj t ⋅ =∑
=
, where wtj is the fraction of individuals 







θ , where θti is the sampling 
weight for household I multiplied by the number of persons in the household in 
period t, and Ntj is the number of type j households in period t), and  ) ( ˆ y ftj  is the 
estimated density for household type j in period t. The counterfactual distribution 
of income which allows the distribution of households to change from period 0 to 
period 1, but holds the distribution of household type incomes constant as in 
period 0, is simply 
  ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ
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That is,  ) ( ˆ
0 y f
H  is obtained by reweighting the period 0 household type income 
densities by the period 1 household type fractions. The estimated change in the 
distribution explained by this counterfactual is 
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National Superannuation 
The effects of changes in the statutory rate(s) of NS over the period can 
be expressed in terms of translations of incomes as follows. Let Yti be the level of 
income of household i in year t (i.e. yti = log(Yti)), and let 
N
ti Y  be the NS 
component of income for the household. Constructing a counterfactual 
distribution for changes in NS rates requires adjusting the actual NS received in 
period 0 (
N
i Y0 ) to take account of the statutory changes between period 0 and 
period 1. We denote this change πi = NS1i/NS0i, where NS0i and NS1i are the 
statutory rates of NS applicable to household i in period 0 and exactly 12 years 
later.
32 The adjusted (log) total income for the household in period 0 is then 
obtained by scaling the actual NS received in period 0 to account for the statutory-
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Conditional on changes in the distribution of household types, the counterfactual 
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and the marginal effect of the change in the distribution explained by changes in 
NS rates is 
  ∑
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Household socio-demographic attributes 
The effects of changes in the socio-demographic attributes and 
employment outcomes of households on the distribution of household income can 
be captured by reweighting the period 0 sample weights to take account of 
changes in such attributes and employment outcomes between period 0 and period 
1. To facilitate this, we express the household type density of income as the 
                                                           
32 For households with one person aged over 60 we apply the statutory rate for single people, while 
for households with at least two people aged over 60 we apply the statutory rate for couples. If the 
household has no one aged over 60, we set πji = 0. NS1i is six years later than NS0i for the 1983/86–
1989/92 and 1989/92–1995/98 sub-period analyses. 44 
integral of the density of income conditional on a set of household demographic 
attributes, x, and employment outcomes, e: 
  ∫
Ω ∈ ) , ( ) , (
) , ( ) , ; (
x e x e
tj tj tj x e dF e x y f   =   (y) f  (A3) 
where  Ω(e,x) is the domain of the household employment outcomes and 
demographic attributes, and Ftj(e, x) is the joint distribution of (e, x) for household 
type j in period t. In order to distinguish the effects of changes in the attributes and 
employment outcomes, we first analyse the effects of changes in demographics 
attributes, and then changes in employment outcomes conditional on attributes. 
This approach is captured by rewriting (A3) as 
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For each household type j, we construct a counterfactual density 
allowing the distribution of attributes to be as observed in period 1, but holding 
the conditional distribution of employment outcomes and the density of incomes 
within each household type as in period 0: 
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where  ψxj(x) = dF1j(x)/dF0j(x) is a "reweighting" function which rescales the 
period 0 density of attributes to obtain the prevailing period 1 density. Note that, 
by applying Bayes' rule, this function can be expressed as 
  ψxj(x) = 
1) = (t P
0) = (t P
.
x) | 0 = (t P
x) | 1 = (t P
x) 0 = (t P










where (e.g.) Pj(t = 1|x) is the conditional probability that a household with 
attributes x is observed in period 1, and Pj(t = 1) is the unconditional probability 
that the household is observed in period 1. 
In order to obtain estimates of the reweighting function, we first pool 
the period 0 and period 1 households and estimate the probability that household i 
is observed in period 1, given attributes x, for each household type j, using a logit  
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model for the binary dependent variable t.
33 We then use the estimates from this 
model to predict, for each household observed in period 0, the relative probability 
that it would be observed in period 1 versus period 0 (i.e. 
) | 0 ( ˆ / ) | 1 ( ˆ
0 0 i j i j x t P x t P = = ) and adjust this by Pj(t = 0)/Pj(t = 1) to obtain the 
estimated “reweight” for this household,  ) ( ˆ 0i xj x ψ . The counterfactual density for 
household type j that takes account of changes in attributes is then estimated by 
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and the estimated marginal effect of the change in the distribution that is 
explained by changes in socio-demographic attributes is 
  ∑
=
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Household employment outcomes 
Returning to the effects of changes in employment outcomes 
conditional on changes in attributes, for each household type we construct a 
counterfactual density that allows the distribution of employment outcomes to be 
as in period 1, but the density of incomes conditional on employment to be as in 
period 0. That is 
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where ψe|x,j(e,x) = dF1j(e|x)/dF0j(e|x) is a "reweighting" function which rescales 
the period 0 density of employment outcomes conditional on attributes to obtain 
the prevailing period 1 density. For this purpose, we consider a discrete set of Mj 
employment outcomes for household type j, defined according to the numbers of 
full-time workers and the presence of part-time workers in the household, and 
                                                           
33 The logit specifications and model results are presented in column (1) of Appendix Tables 
A1(a)–A1(d) for each household type. 46 
define em = 1 if the household has employment outcome m and em = 0 otherwise 
(m = 0, …, Mj).
34 The reweighting function is 
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where ) | 1 ( x e P m tj =  is the probability of employment outcome m in period t, 
given attributes x. 
To estimate the reweighting function  ) , ( ˆ 0 0 , | i i j x e x e ψ , we first estimate, 
separately for each period, ordered logit models for the employment outcome 
conditional on household i attributes ) | 1 ( ˆ
ti m tj x e P = . For each household observed in 
period 0, we then use these models to predict the relative probability of 
employment outcome em in period 1 versus period 0 and calculate 
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Given this estimated reweight, the counterfactual density for household 
type j that takes account of changes in employment outcomes is estimated by 
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The counterfactual distribution of income across all households is again 
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and the marginal effect of changes in employment outcomes is 
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Economic returns to attributes 
The final explanatory factor that we analyse is changes in the economic 
“returns” to attributes. For this exercise, we construct a counterfactual density 
allowing the income returns to observed household socio-demographic attributes 
                                                           
34 The employment outcomes are described in Table 3 for each household type.  Summaries of the 
model results are presented in columns (2) and (3) of Appendix Tables A1(a)–A1(d) for each 
household type.  
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to be as in period 1, by adjusting each household’s period 0 income by the 
predicted change given their attributes. 
In particular, for each household type j, we first estimate regressions of 
log equivalised income on socio-demographic attributes separately for each period 
  tji tj tji
N
tji X y ε β + ′ = ˆ
35 
We compute the predicted change in returns,  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ 0 1 0 j j ji ji X y β β − ′ = ∆ , and log 
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then obtain the counterfactual density for household type j that takes account of 
this change in returns 
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The counterfactual distribution of income across all households is again obtained 
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and the marginal effect of the change in the distribution explained by changes in 
economic returns is 
  ∑
=
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On the basis of these sequentially constructed counterfactual densities, 
the total change in the density of log household equivalised income between 
period 0 and period 1 can be decomposed into “explained” and “unexplained” 
components, as follows: 
  ( ) ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ
0 1 0 0 1 y f y f (y) f     (y) f y f y f
REXNH REXNH
0 − + − = −  (A9) 
                                                           
35 We estimate these models using quantile (median) regression rather than least squares methods 
in order to minimise the effects of outliers on the estimated shifts in the returns. The results of 
these models are presented in columns (4) and (5) of Appendix Tables A1(a)–A1(d) for each 
household type. 48 
where  (y) f     (y) f
0
REXNH ˆ ˆ
0 −  represents the total change in the distribution explained 
by the sets of factors we have examined here, and  (y) f     (y) f
REXNH
0 1 ˆ ˆ −  represents the 
change in the overall income distribution which remains unexplained. 
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Table A1(a): Counterfactual analysis for single adult under 60 households 
   
Variable Attributes   Employment  outcomes   Economic  returns   
   1983–86  1995–98  1983–86  1995–98 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
 
Female -0.040  -1.062  -0.675  -0.304  -0.213 
   (.109)  (.193)  (.169)  (.055)  (.058) 
Māori 0.925  -0.394  -0.784  -0.352  -0.282 
   (.234)  (.311)  (.267)  (.137)  (.107) 
Aged 15–18  1.119  -2.107  0.826  -0.034  0.090 
 (.723)  (1.11)  (1.18)  (.273)  (.380) 
Aged 25–39  0.905  -0.833  0.297  0.268  0.502 
 (.210)  (.707)  (.396)  (.089)  (.126) 
Aged 40–49  1.465  -1.251  0.205  0.272  0.637 
 (.222)  (.703)  (.400)  (.099)  (.130) 
Aged 50+  1.231  -2.257  -0.236  0.150  0.502 
 (.215)  (.693)  (.389)  (.092)  (.129) 
Highest qualification 
School 0.691  0.263  0.985  0.330  0.446 
   (.146)  (.236)  (.217)  (.073)  (.078) 
Vocational 0.376  0.620  0.894 0.411  0.439 
   (.142)  (.239)  (.213)  (.069)  (.087) 
University 0.908  1.634  1.571  0.665  0.855 
   (.170)  (.379)  (.278)  (.086)  (.087) 
 
Intercept -1.210  ---  ---  10.248  9.836 
 (.223)      (.095)  (.133) 
First break  ---  -3.292  -1.067  ---  --- 
   (.710)  (.404) 
Second break  ---  -3.011  -0.530  ---  --- 
   (.708)  (.402) 
 
Pseudo R
2 0.043  0.139  0.081  0.131  0.131 
 
Number of  1,608  814  794  796  779 
observations 
   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models are estimated using sampling weights. In column 
(1), the dependent variable equals 1 if the observation is from 1995–98, and 0 if from 1983–86, and the 
specification estimated is a Logit model. In columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable is defined in 
Table 3, and the specifications are Ordered Logit models. In columns (4) and (5), the dependent variable 
is log(household income), and the specifications are estimated using median regressions. See text for 
further details. 50 
Table A1(b): Counterfactual analysis for multiple adults under 60 households 
   
Variable Attributes  Employment  outcomes Economic  returns   
   1983–86  1995–98  1983–86  1995–98 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)   
 
Number of adults  0.198  0.639  0.483  0.124  0.117 
 (.047)  (.073)  (.058)  (.008)  (.023) 
Fraction of adults: 
Female 0.156  -0.627  -0.578  -0.459  -0.092 
 (.178)  (.262)  (.219)  (.031)  (.086) 
Māori 1.614  0.049  -0.357  -0.037  -0.098 
 (.179)  (.193)  (.198)  (.030)  (.075) 
Married 0.209  0.766  0.953  0.147  0.190 
 (.089)  (.130)  (.131)  (.013)  (.045) 
Aged 15–18  -0.623  1.177  -0.212  0.117  -0.198 
 (.287)  (.467)  (.348)  (.044)  (.144) 
Aged 25–39  0.864  0.488  0.971  0.701  0.411 
 (.128)  (.216)  (.192)  (.021)  (.066) 
Aged 40–49  1.920  -0.060  0.496  0.763  0.486 
 (.154)  (.228)  (.213)  (.023)  (.076) 
Aged 50+  1.416  -1.887  -0.525  0.556  0.272 
 (.136)  (.205)  (.193)  (.021)  (.070) 
Fraction of adults with highest qualifications 
School 1.656  0.510  0.984  0.324  0.426 
 (.123)  (.155)  (.158)  (.017)  (.061) 
Vocational 1.221  0.910  1.056  0.333  0.499 
 (.120)  (.170)  (.158)  (.017)  (.061) 
University 1.994 0.370  0.430  0.401  0.660 
 (.143)  (.187)  (.177)  (.024)  (.067) 
 
Intercept -2.588  ---  ---  10.034  9.918 
 (.222)      (.034)  (.113) 
First break  ---  -1.853  -0.569  ---  --- 
   (.353)  (.299)     
Second break  ---  -1.610  -0.111  ---  --- 
   (.350)  (.295)     
Third break  ---  0.442  1.143  ---  --- 
   (.343)  (.294) 
Fourth break  ---  0.864  1.965  ---  --- 
   (.343)  (.296) 
 
Pseudo R
2 0.082 0.104  0.054  0.131  0.107 
 
Number of  5,185  2,802  2,383  2,771  2,328 
observations 
   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models are estimated using sampling weights. In column 
(1), the dependent variable equals 1 if the observation is from 1995–98, and 0 if from 1983–86, and the 
specification estimated is a Logit model. In columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable is defined in 
Table 3, and the specifications are Ordered Logit models. In columns (4) and (5), the dependent variable 
is log(household income), and the specifications are estimated using median regressions. See text for 
further details.  
51 
Table A1(c): Counterfactual analysis for single adult with children households 
   
Variable Attributes  Employment  outcomes   Economic  returns   
   1983–86  1995–98 1983–86  1995–98 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
 
Female -0.159  -1.964  -0.326  0.119  -0.065 
 (.235)  (.366)  (.283)  (.038)  (.039) 
Māori 0.875  -0.873  -0.459  -0.017  -0.034 
 (.198)  (.377)  (.230)  (.030)  (.030) 
Married 1.158  -0.399  -1.184  -0.327  0.069 
 (.446)  (.683)  (.512)  (.063)  (.054) 
Aged 25–39  1.376  1.029  1.624  0.049  -0.028 
 (.652)  (1.72)  (1.12)  (.086)  (.111) 
Aged 40–49  2.446  1.202  1.061  0.043  0.038
 
 (.785)  (1.86)  (1.23)  (.105)  (.132) 
Aged 50+  1.460  -0.604  0.945  -0.102  -0.121 
 (.997)  (2.16)  (1.43)  (.116)  (.177) 
Highest qualification 
School 0.598  0.904  0.930  0.025  0.015 
 (.170)  (.298)  (.224)  (.022)  (.031) 
Vocational 0.779  1.166  0.985 0.116  0.092 
 (.203)  (.325)  (.248)  (.030)  (.035) 
University 0.978  2.096  1.142  0.496  0.208 
 (.304)  (.470)  (.369)  (.040)  (.049) 
Fraction of persons: 
Aged 0–4  3.616  -4.248 -4.697  -1.306 -0.672 
 (1.06)  (2.29)  (1.54)  (.146)  (.180) 
Aged 5–14  2.162  -0.206 -2.111  -1.082 -0.507 
 (.843)  (1.93)  (1.29)  (.117)  (.148) 
Aged 15–18  1.821  2.702  -1.431  -0.802  -0.177 
 (.974)  (2.14)  (1.46)  (.140)  (.179) 
 
Intercept -1.872  ---  ---  10.247  10.208 
 (.751)      (.107)  (.131) 
First break  ---  -1.127  -0.544  ---  --- 
   (1.86)  (1.20) 
Second break  ---  -0.381  0.664  ---  --- 
   (1.86)  (1.20) 
 
Pseudo R
2 0.052  0.252  0.116  0.179  0.083 
 
Number of  1,013  428  585  427  579 
observations 
   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models are estimated using sampling weights. In column (1), 
the dependent variable equals 1 if the observation is from 1995–98, and 0 if from 1983–86, and the 
specification estimated is a Logit model. In columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable is defined in Table 
3, and the specifications are Ordered Logit models. In columns (4) and (5), the dependent variable is 
log(household income), and the specifications are estimated using median regressions. See text for further 
details. 52 
Table A1(d): Counterfactual analysis for multiple adults with children households 
   
Variable Attributes   Employment  outcomes     Economic  returns   
   1983–86  1995–98  1983–86  1995–98 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)   
 
Number of adults  -0.009 1.525 0.910  0.237 0.074 
  (.058) (.100) (.083)  (.044) (.025) 
Fraction of adults: 
Female  0.999 -2.318 -1.851  0.381 -0.126 
  (.265) (.359) (.341)  (.168) (.053) 
Māori  0.816 -0.235 -0.148  0.022  0.036 
  (.109) (.124) (.134)  (.071) (.043) 
Married  -0.194 0.723 1.004  0.235  -0.126 
  (.132) (.160) (.182)  (.057) (.053) 
Aged 15–18  0.089  -0.698  0.253  -0.508  -1.413 
  (.442) (.657) (.575)  (.222) (.178) 
Aged 25–39  1.069  -0.103  1.273  0.647  -0.113 
  (.294) (.380) (.404)  (.184) (.116) 
Aged 40–49  2.483  -0.539  1.691  0.728  0.039 
  (.333) (.421) (.455)  (.198) (.133) 
Aged  50+  1.996 -2.542 -1.615  -0.031  0.148 
  (.368) (.477) (.505)  (.239) (.147) 
Fraction of adults with highest qualifications: 
School  1.769 0.542 0.865  0.267 0.469 
  (.102) (.117) (.127)  (.043) (.042) 
Vocational  1.099 0.408 0.939  0.364 0.564 
  (.105) (.125) (.133)  (.050) (.044) 
University  2.023 0.505 0.514  0.598 0.863 
  (.120) (.132) (.143)  (.053) (.047) 
Fraction of persons: 
Aged  0–4  1.307 -4.972 -2.641  -0.927 -1.716 
  (.417) (.509) (.538)  (.234) (.169) 
Aged  5–14  0.893 -1.019 -0.606  -0.495 -1.126 
  (.341) (.427) (.451)  (.215) (.139) 
Aged 15–18  0.312  1.527  -0.625  0.228  0.104 
  (.551) (.758) (.702)  (.301) (.234) 
Intercept  -2.620 --- ---  9.266  11.039 
  (.392)    (.333)  (.159) 
First  break  --- -2.046 -0.138  ---  --- 
   (.544)  (.542) 
Second break  ---  -1.770  0.443  ---  --- 
   (.542)  (.542) 
Third  break  --- 1.471 2.207  --- 
   (.538)  (.544) 
Fourth  break  --- 2.448 3.549  --- 
   (.539)  (.546) 
 
Pseudo R
2  0.080 0.136 0.073  0.185 0.132 
 
Number  of  6,741 4,008 2,733  3,941 2,681 
observations 
   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models are estimated using sampling weights. In column 
(1), the dependent variable equals 1 if the observation is from 1995–98, and 0 if from 1983–86, and the 
specification estimated is a Logit model. In columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable is defined in 
Table 3, and the specifications are Ordered Logit models. In columns (4) and (5), the dependent variable 
is log (household income), and the specifications are estimated using median regressions. See text for 
further details.  
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Table A2: Employment outcomes 
   
 
Employment Single  Multiple  Single  Multiple 
outcome adult  adults  adult  adults 
  under 60  under 60  with kids  with kids 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
   
 
1983–86 
  0  0.173 0.039 0.591 0.037 
  1  0.034 0.010 0.108 0.009 
  2  0.792 0.195 0.301 0.364 
  3  --- 0.070  --- 0.184 




  0  0.303 0.072 0.696 0.113 
  1  0.056 0.045 0.121 0.036 
  2  0.642 0.195 0.183 0.321 
  3  --- 0.118  --- 0.243 




  0  0.215 0.052 0.615 0.091 
  1  0.086 0.049 0.197 0.050 
  2  0.699 0.143 0.188 0.288 
  3  --- 0.152  --- 0.273 
  4  --- 0.604  --- 0.298 
   
Notes: All entries are fractions, and sum to one for each column within each block. The employment 
outcome category for each household type is defined according to the presence of part-time (PT) and full-
time (FT) workers: ‘0’ corresponds to no workers; ‘1’ corresponds to any PT workers; ‘2’ corresponds to 
a single FT worker; ‘3’ corresponds to a single FT worker and any PT workers; ‘4’ corresponds to at 
least two FT workers. 
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Motu Economic and Public Policy Research  
  
  Motu Economic and Public Policy is a non-profit Research Institute (Charitable Trust) that 
has been registered since 1 September, 2000. The Trust aims to promote well-informed and reasoned 
debate on public policy issues relevant to New Zealand decision making. Motu is independent and does 
not advocate an expressed ideology or political position.  
  Motu aims to enhance the economic research and policy environment in New Zealand by 
carrying out high quality independent research, teaching through universities and other institutions, 
training junior research staff, facilitating networks of researchers, hosting foreign researchers and 
organising small conferences and dialogue groups. It is our belief that objective research and analysis is a 
critical foundation for making informed policy decisions and we are committed to wide dissemination of 
our work.  
  Motu's primary strength lies in its people. All of our principal researchers have PhDs in 
economics from top international universities as well as extensive public policy-related work experience. 
Our distinctive contribution is an emphasis on sound empirical analysis, supported by our expertise in and 
knowledge of economic theory and institutional design. We choose research areas that build on the 
interests and expertise of our principal researchers. Our current priorities are in the areas of environmental 
regulation, labour and social policy, and macroeconomics. 
  We maintain strong links with a large pool of internationally renowned experts in our chosen 
fields. These international linkages are critical to our success, and one of our major contributions to New 
Zealand.  
  Our research funding is primarily in the form of research grants. We see this as a means of 
maintaining our commitment to the quality and objectivity of our research. We are able to compete 
internationally for such funding because of the calibre of our principal researchers and because of 
international fascination with the New Zealand reforms. Some of our funding comes from foreign 
foundations and governments. This serves not only to expand the available pool of research on New 
Zealand policy issues, but also to stimulate wider interest in these issues. We also seek unrestricted 
funding from individuals, foundations and corporations to allow us to build a stronger research 
infrastructure within Motu and the wider research community. This allows us to actively disseminate 
ideas, create longer term independent research programs that do not meet short-term funding priorities, 
and organise networks and conferences involving other researchers and policy analysts. 
Motu purposes 
1.  Carrying out and facilitating empirical and theoretical research on public policy issues 
relevant to New Zealand; the quality of the research will meet international academic 
standards, suitable for acceptance in reputable academic journals. 
2.  Making existing knowledge more accessible for policy debates in New Zealand; this may be 
done by summarising and critically reviewing existing work on public policy issues, or by 
contributing to and facilitating policy discussions through seminars, workshops, and dialogue 
groups. 
3.  Disseminating the results of our work and knowledge through publication (particularly in 
refereed publications), the internet, conferences, seminars, workshops, dialogue groups, and 
teaching. 
4.  Building New Zealand capacity to carry out empirical and theoretical research on New 
Zealand public policy.  This will be done through means such as training, collaboration, 
sponsorship of students or researchers and development of New Zealand databases.        
5.  Maintaining close links with international experts working on topics related to our purpose 
through communication and collaboration. 
6.  Advancing our work and purpose within New Zealand by facilitating the visits of relevant 
international visitors. 
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